

Message Text

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PAGE 01 STATE 089601
ORIGIN IO-14

INFO OCT-01 NEA-10 PM-05 ISO-00 SIG-03 SS-15 SP-02
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DRAFTED BY IO/UNP:DJMANGAN:MR
APPROVED BY IO:GBHELMAN
IO/UNP:RLBARRY
NEA:MDRAPER
PM:JBURGESS

-----028106 070248Z /66

O P 070234Z APR 78
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU PRIORITY
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
SECDEF WASHDC 0089
JCS WASHDC 0066

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 089601

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MASS, XF, LE, UN

SUBJECT: SOUTH LEBANON: POSSIBILITY OF UN TROOPS ACCOMPANY-
ING LEBANESE MILITARY SOUTH

REF: A) STATE 77038; B) JERUSALEM 983; C) BEIRUT 1914;
D) KATHMANDU 1733

1. AS YOU KNOW, WE HAVE BEEN CONSIDERING SENDING THE
NEPALESE CONTINGENT, OR A GOOD PART OF IT, TO RAYAQ
AIRPORT IN THE BEKAA WITH THE OBJECT OF INDUCING THE
GOL TO DESPATCH A SIZEABLE NUMBER OF LEBANESE TROOPS
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TO ACCOMPANY THE NEPALESE TO THE SOUTH. WHILE THERE ARE
LOGISTICAL AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS TO BE OVERCOME AND
ONLY A SHORT TIME TO OVERCOME THEM, WE THINK THE BENEFITS
OF GETTING A SIGNIFICANT LAF CONTINGENT SOUTH OF THE
LITANI FAR OUTWEIGH THE DIFFICULTIES. BEFORE PURSUING
THE MATTER, HOWEVER, WE NEED EMBASSY BEIRUT'S
JUDGMENT AS TO WHETHER NEPALESE ACCOMPANIMENT WOULD

MATERIALLY AFFECT A) THE NUMBER OF LAF TROOPS TO BE SENT SOUTH; B) THE SPEED WITH WHICH THEY WILL BE DESPATCHED; OR C) THE DEGREE OF CERTAINTY THAT THEY WILL BE SENT AT ALL. PLEASE LET US KNOW SOONEST IF YOU THINK THIS PLAN IS WORTH PURSUING. IF YOU BELIEVE IT IS, WE WILL GO ALL OUT IN THE TIME LEFT TO WORK OUT SEVERE LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS. FOR EXAMPLE, WE DO NOT KNOW WHETHER

US AIRCRAFT WOULD BE ABLE TO FLY DIRECTLY INTO RAYAQ OR WHETHER ALTERNATIVE ARRANGEMENTS WOULD HAVE TO BE MADE.

2. THERE ARE A NUMBER OF PRACTICAL QUESTIONS TO WHICH WE WILL NEED ANSWERS. FOR EXAMPLE, RAYAQ IS A LEBANESE AIR BASE IN ADF-CONTROLLED TERRITORY, SO WE ASSUME THAT SECURITY PROBLEMS THERE WOULD BE MINIMAL. IS THAT ASSUMPTION CORRECT? IS IT POSSIBLE TO MOVE FORWARD SCHEDULED VISIT TO FIELD BY DOD SURVEY TEAM TO APRIL 7 FOR FIRST-HAND MILITARY APPROVAL? WOULD GOL PERMIT A BRIEF SITE SURVEY BY QUALIFIED AIR FORCE EXPERT TO ASSESS TECHNICAL FACTORS?

3. FYI: WE ARE EXPLORING THE LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS OF BREAKING UP THE NEPALESE CONTINGENT INTO TWO PARTS AND SENDING THEM TO TWO DESTINATIONS (PERSONNEL TO RAYAQ AND VEHICLES TO BEN GURION, FROM WHICH THEY CONFIDENTIAL

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WOULD BE DRIVEN TO RAYAQ FOR LINK-UP).

4. BASED ON YOUR RESPONSE, WE WILL EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITIES FOR ACTUALLY ORGANIZING THIS PLAN.

5. INFO ADDRESSEES SHOULD NOT DISCUSS THINKING IN THIS TELEGRAM WITH HOST GOVERNMENTS. VANCE

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ORIGIN NEA-04

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /005 R

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DRAFTED BY:NEA/RA:JVMONTVILLE:YW

APPROVED BY:NEA/RA:SEPALMER,JR

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON 2591

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 089601

FOR KINSOLVING

FOLLOWING REPEAT STATE 89601 ACTION BEIRUT INFO KATHMANDU
USUN NEW YORK, TEL AVIV, JERUSALEM, SECDEF AND JCS DATED
APRIL 7, 1978.

QUOTE: C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 089601

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